District of Columbia Court of Appeals

1. Structural Error: Right to Counsel of Choice

This issue addresses whether the trial court’s *sua sponte* (on its own motion) removal of the appellant's retained counsel of choice, Christopher Mutimer, constituted a structural error under the Sixth Amendment, thereby requiring automatic reversal.

• The dismissal occurred over the appellant’s express objection and without a valid cause such as inability to pay, a conflict of interest, or calendar necessity.
• Under United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the erroneous deprivation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is a "structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds".
• Such an error is not subject to harmless-error analysis and mandates reversal of the conviction without any showing of prejudice.
• Key Authorities: United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

2. Inadequate Monroe-Farrell Inquiry: Ineffective Assistance

This issue concerns the trial court's failure to conduct a "probing and specific" inquiry into the appellant’s detailed pretrial allegations of ineffective assistance by his court-appointed counsel, Albert Amissah.

• The appellant alleged numerous specific deficiencies, including a persistent failure to retain expert witnesses for approximately six months, mismanagement of his calendar leading to delays, and failure to file requested motions.
• The court’s failure to adequately investigate these substantial claims deprived the appellant of his constitutional right to effective representation and, under D.C. law, mandates that the convictions be vacated.
• Key Authorities: Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1978); Portillo v. United States, 62 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2013); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

3. Advocate-Witness Rule & Improper Vouching

This issue addresses whether the trial court erred by refusing to disqualify Assistant United States Attorney John Giovannelli, whose personal involvement in acquiring and authenticating a critical piece of contested evidence (Government Exhibit 8) compromised the trial's fairness.

• AUSA Giovannelli was the direct recipient of the privileged email from the appellant's former, disbarred counsel.
• By prosecuting a case where he was a necessary witness to the evidence's origin and integrity, he acted as a "silent witness," which is prohibited by the advocate-witness rule.
• This conduct also constituted improper vouching, as his participation served to inform the jury that he had special knowledge and personally believed the evidence was reliable.
• Key Authorities: United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1998); Walker v. State, 818 A.2d 1078 (Md. 2003); Simms v. United States, 41 A.3d 482 (D.C. 2012).

4. Erroneous Admission of Privileged Communication

This issue argues the trial court erred by admitting Government Exhibit 8, a privileged email from the appellant to his former counsel, after expressly finding that the crime-fraud exception to the privilege did not apply.

• The court's finding that the crime-fraud exception was inapplicable should have rendered the communication inadmissible.
• The court’s subsequent finding of waiver was flawed, as the government's own repeated and improper use of the email in court filings had already destroyed its confidentiality long before the appellant's pro se filing.
• Allowing the government to benefit from its own prior misconduct is precisely the type of unfairness the rule guards against.
• Key Authorities: Waters v. United States, 302 A.3d 522 (D.C. 2023); Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003); Moore v. United States, 285 A.3d 228 (D.C. 2022); In re Grimm, 252 A.3d 486 (D.C. 2021).

5. Denial of Bifurcated Trial for Mental State Defense

This issue contends that the trial court's denial of the appellant’s written request for a bifurcated (two-part) trial was a reversible error.

• The denial prejudiced the appellant's ability to present his mental state defense (related to ADHD, PTSD, and sleep apnea) on the crucial element of "willfulness".
• It forced the defense to present complex psychiatric evidence alongside the simple factual elements of the Bail Reform Act charges, creating a significant risk that the jury would be confused or prejudiced.
• D.C. case law recognizes that such conditions can be a persuasive defense to the willfulness element of a BRA charge.
• Key Authorities: Wilkins v. United States, 137 A.3d 975 (D.C. 2016); Evans v. United States, 133 A.3d 988 (D.C. 2016).

6. Speedy Trial Violation: Failure to Extradite

This issue argues the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the indictment where the government violated the appellant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial by failing to seek his extradition for over four years.

• The government knew the appellant's whereabouts in treaty countries but failed to exercise "due diligence" to secure his return.
• Despite telling the court in 2018 that it was "working on extradition," the Department of Justice later internally communicated its "no intent to seek the defendant's extradition" from Australia in 2020.
• Such an extensive delay caused by government negligence or inaction weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
• Key Authorities: Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992); United States v. Handa, 892 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Heshelman, 521 F. App’x 501 (6th Cir. 2013).

7. Vindictive Prosecution & Superseding Indictment

This issue asserts the trial court should have dismissed the superseding indictment on the grounds that it was a product of vindictive prosecution, among other violations.

• The government brought a second BRA count nearly five years after the facts were known and, critically, only one week after the appellant exercised his constitutional right by filing a speedy trial motion that criticized the prosecutor's conduct.
• This timing and context created a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness," shifting the burden to the government to justify its actions.
• The government's proffered explanations, such as a "new strategy," were argued to be pretextual.
• Key Authorities: Simms v. United States, 41 A.3d 482 (D.C. 2012); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).

8. Grand Jury Misconduct: Use of Privileged Material

This issue posits that the indictment must be dismissed because of grand jury misconduct, specifically the government's presentation of privileged attorney-client communications to the grand jury.

• The government presented the privileged email (Govt. Ex. 8) to the grand jury *before* any judicial determination of its status. The trial court later explicitly ruled that the crime-fraud exception did not apply.
• This conduct usurped the court's gatekeeping role and undermined the integrity of the grand jury process.
• Dismissal is appropriate if the misconduct "substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict".
• Key Authorities: Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988); In re Public Defender Service, 831 A.2d 890 (D.C. 2003); Adams v. Franklin, 924 A.2d 993 (D.C. 2007).

9. Counsel's Collusion & Tainted Indictment

This issue argues that dismissal of the indictment is the only appropriate remedy where it was the direct fruit of an egregious breach of trust by the appellant's former defense counsel.

• Appellant's former counsel, Bernard Grimm, disclosed privileged communications to the government, effectively "switching sides" and colluding with the prosecution.
• Such an intentional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes a *per se* Sixth Amendment violation where prejudice is presumed.
• Where the indictment itself is the direct product of the misconduct, suppression of the evidence at trial is an insufficient remedy; the entire prosecution is tainted and must be dismissed.
• Key Authorities: Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995); Simpson v. United States, 632 A.2d 374 (D.C. 1993); In re Grimm, 252 A.3d 486 (D.C. 2021).

10. Failure to State an Offense

This issue challenges the indictment for failing to state a felony offense, arguing that D.C. law does not authorize a felony charge for failure to appear in connection with an underlying misdemeanor.

• D.C. Code § 23-1327(a)(2) prescribes a maximum penalty of "not more than one year" imprisonment for failure to appear in a misdemeanor case.
• Under D.C. Code § 22-106, an offense punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year is, by definition, a misdemeanor, not a felony.
• The rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity in a criminal statute be resolved in favor of the defendant.
• Key Authorities: (James) Jones v. United States, 716 A.2d 160 (D.C. 1998); Brown v. United States, 795 A.2d 56 (D.C. 2001).

11. Multiplicitous Indictment & Double Jeopardy

This issue argues that charging the appellant with two separate felony BRA counts for failing to appear in the same underlying misdemeanor case constitutes a multiplicitous indictment that violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.

• The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against receiving multiple punishments for the same offense.
• The two charges arose from a single, continuous act of absconding from one judicial process after a single release order.
• The proper remedy for multiplicitous convictions is not merely concurrent sentencing but the vacatur of the duplicative conviction.
• Key Authorities: Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); Sanchez-Rengifo v. United States, 815 A.2d 351 (D.C. 2002).

12. Illegal Sentence Increase & Due Process Violation

This issue argues that the trial court acted without jurisdiction and violated the appellant’s due process rights when it *sua sponte* resentenced him to a harsher term more than six months after the original sentence was imposed.

• The court lost jurisdiction to correct the sentence after the 120-day limit in Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 expired.
• The original sentence was not "illegal" but, at worst, "imposed in an illegal manner," meaning the 120-day jurisdictional limit was strict and could not be extended.
• The belated and substantive increase, which added a four-year term of probation that the judge had explicitly rejected at the initial sentencing, violated the appellant's due process right to finality.
• Key Authorities: Jordan v. United States, 235 A.3d 808 (D.C. 2020); Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145 (D.C. 1984); Smith v. United States, 687 A.2d 581 (D.C. 1996).

Legal Significance and Impact

Systemic Issues

The case highlights fundamental problems in the legal system:

• Judicial Oversight: Need for better judicial accountability and oversight
• Prosecutorial Ethics: Limits on prosecutorial discretion and misconduct
• Attorney Regulation: Gaps in attorney disciplinary systems
• Grand Jury Process: Protection of grand jury integrity